A House of Cards Falls: Why  Too Big to Debar  is All Slogan and Little Substance by Tillipman, Jessica
Fordham Law School
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Res Gestae
1-13-2012
A House of Cards Falls: Why "Too Big to Debar" is
All Slogan and Little Substance
Jessica Tillipman
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/res_gestae
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Res Gestae by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please
contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tillipman, Jessica, "A House of Cards Falls: Why "Too Big to Debar" is All Slogan and Little Substance" (2012). Res Gestae. Paper 7.
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/res_gestae/7
 49 
A HOUSE OF CARDS FALLS:  
WHY “TOO BIG TO DEBAR” IS ALL SLOGAN 
AND LITTLE SUBSTANCE 
Jessica Tillipman*
 
 
“The serious nature of debarment and suspension requires that these 
sanctions be imposed only in the public interest for the Government’s 
protection and not for purposes of punishment.”1
Experts in government procurement were disappointed to read FCPA 
Sanctions:  Too Big to Debar
 
2 by Drury D. Stevenson and Nicholas J. 
Wagoner.  Despite its populist appeal, the article’s fundamental premise is 
legally and factually wrong.  In the past decade, as the U.S. government has 
aggressively enforced the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act3
If FCPA enforcement has touched every industry, why do the authors 
single out large government contractors?  Because they can—large 
government contractors are not sympathetic characters.  Even though nearly 
all companies, regardless of their size or line of business are exposed to the 
potential misconduct of rogue employees, government contractors are 
expected to defy the statistically impossible.  While it is reasonable to 
expect ethical conduct from companies that receive taxpayer dollars (as the 
 (FCPA), 
companies of every size in nearly every industry have paid considerably for 
their bribery of foreign officials, demonstrating that no company is immune 
from potential FCPA liability if they do business abroad.  Despite the 
FCPA’s widespread impact, the article has declared war on one segment of 
the population:  large government contractors.  The authors argue that the 
best way to deter contractors from bribing foreign officials is to debar them 
from the procurement system—the corporate equivalent of a death sentence. 
 
*  Assistant Dean for Outside Placement at The George Washington University Law School.  
As a Professorial Lecturer in Law, she teaches a seminar on corruption control in 
government contracts.  She has specialized in government procurement law for over a 
decade, including serving as a law clerk to the Honorable Lawrence S. Margolis of the U.S. 
Court of Federal Claims and practicing in the Government Contracts and White Collar 
Criminal Defense and Counseling practice groups of Jenner & Block’s D.C. office.  She 
thanks her long-time colleague and mentor, Professor Steven L. Schooner, for his invaluable 
feedback and support, and Jessica Henson for her vital research and dedication. 
 1. FAR 9.402(b) (2008) (emphasis added). 
 2. Drury D. Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, FCPA Sanctions:  Too Big to Debar, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 775 (2011). 
 3. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 
(2006)).   
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seemingly limitless Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) already do),4 it 
is not only self-defeating but also unreasonable to demand debarment,5 
simply because it is “far more crippling to a company’s bottom line.”6
I.  DEBARMENT IS FOR THE GOVERNMENT’S PROTECTION, 
NOT PUNISHMENT 
 
To experienced government procurement practitioners, one of the most 
glaring errors in Too Big to Debar is its fundamentally flawed 
characterization of debarment as a punitive regime.  Indeed, at least a third 
of the article’s text is devoted to theories of punishment.  To understand 
why this issue undermines the thesis of the article, a brief overview of the 
FAR is warranted. 
As FAR 9.4 makes clear, the government is required to use 
administrative suspension and debarment “only in the public interest for the 
Government’s protection,” to ensure that the government contracts with 
“responsible” partners.7  Debarment may last for up to three years,8 and 
may be as broad or as limited as the government deems necessary to protect 
its interests, ranging from the debarment of the entire company to the 
debarment of a division, facility, or even a single individual.9  Notably, 
because the system is not designed to punish contractors, debarment only 
applies to future contracts, task orders, and options to extend current 
contracts—it does not impact existing contract work with the government.10
As the authors aptly demonstrate, an important but frequently 
misunderstood aspect of the debarment regime is that debarment is to be 
used only for the purpose of protecting the government, not to punish past 
misconduct.
 
11  As the FAR clearly states, “The serious nature of debarment 
and suspension requires that these sanctions be imposed only in the public 
interest for the Government’s protection and not for purposes of 
punishment.”12
 
 4. See Jessica Tillipman, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act & Government 
Contractors:  Compliance Trends & Collateral Consequences, BRIEFING PAPERS, Aug. 2011, 
at 18 n.2 (“The Federal Acquisition Regulations System, consisting of the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation and agency supplemental acquisition regulations, is a robust set of 
rules and requirements governing the U.S. Government’s procurement process.”). 
  This fundamental distinction is crucial to understanding 
how the process works and why certain debarment determinations are 
 5. For purposes of brevity, the use of the term “debarment” will hereinafter signify both 
“debarment” and “suspension,” unless otherwise indicated. 
 6. Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 2, at 805. 
 7. FAR 9.402(a), (b).  FAR 9.104-1 outlines the standards used to determine whether 
prospective contractors and subcontractors are responsible. 
 8. Contrary to the article’s claim that debarments last for a “standard two-year period,” 
see Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 2, at 778, 820, FAR 9.406-4(a)(1) expressly states 
that debarment should not exceed three years, see FAR 9.406-4(a)(1).  The origin of this 
“standard two-year period” is unknown. 
 9. See FAR 9.406-1(b); see also Tillipman, supra note 4, at 9. 
 10. See FAR 9.405-1. 
 11. See FAR 9.402(b) (“Agencies shall impose debarment or suspension to protect the 
Government’s interest and only for the causes and in accordance with the procedures set 
forth in this subpart.”). 
 12. Id. (emphasis added). 
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made.  Fines and incarceration are prosecutors’ tools.  Debarment is not a 
tool of punishment and, therefore, remains wholly independent of the 
criminal justice system.  It is an administrative remedy that permits 
agencies to exclude contractors from the federal procurement system only 
to protect the government from imminent harm. 
Again, debarment is not an additional layer of punishment.  This is a 
crucial distinction emphasized by the plain language of the FAR, which 
warns that “[t]he existence of a cause for debarment . . . does not 
necessarily require that the contractor be debarred.”13  In other words, even 
if there are potential grounds to debar a contractor because of past 
misconduct, Suspension and Debarment Officials (SDOs) should not do so 
until they have considered “any remedial measures or mitigating factors” 
that may shed light on whether the contractor is presently responsible.14  
Indeed, “where a contractor is determined to be presently responsible 
despite past misconduct, it presents no threat to the government’s interests, 
making debarment inappropriate.”15
Although the authors briefly mention the FAR’s prohibition against using 
debarment to punish contractors,
 
16
II.  BAE SYSTEMS:  A CASE STUDY IN FLAWED ANALYSIS 
 their article completely disregards this 
fundamental tenet of the regime (and the regulation’s plain language) by 
repeatedly referring to debarment as punishment.  The limited courtesy 
provided to the actual text of the FAR demonstrates that the authors are 
wedded to their own ideas of what the regime should be, than to what it 
actually is. 
Too Big to Debar cites the 2010 FCPA enforcement action against BAE 
as evidence that the Department of Justice is somehow improperly 
influencing SDOs to refrain from debarring contractors that have allegedly 
violated the FCPA.17  The article contends that the DOJ charged BAE with 
conspiracy to make false statements to avoid triggering the FAR’s 
“discretionary debarment” authority.18  This statement defies the plain 
language of the regulation.  FAR 9.406-2(a)(3) expressly includes “false 
statements” as potential grounds for discretionary debarment.19
 
 13. FAR 9.406-1(a). 
  Given that 
a violation of the false statements statute is an enumerated ground for 
 14. Id. (providing a list of mitigating factors that a debarment official must consider in 
making a debarment determination). 
 15. Todd J. Canni & Steven A. Shaw, Comments on the Wartime Contracting 
Commission’s Recommendations on Suspension and Debarment, SERVICE CONTRACTOR, 
Sept. 2011, at 14. 
 16. See Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 2, at 807. 
 17. See id. at 798–802. 
 18. See id. at 800. 
 19. See FAR 9.406-2(a)(3) (“The debarring official may debar a contractor for a 
conviction of or civil judgment for . . . making false statements . . . .”). 
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potential debarment, it is utterly confusing (as well as ironic) as to why the 
article contains this erroneous statement.20
One of the more inflammatory and irresponsible statements in the article 
is its wholly unsupported claim that the government is “endors[ing]” or 
“bankrolling” foreign bribery when it “categorically refus[es] to seriously 
consider suspending or debarring companies” that violate the FCPA.
 
21  
These statements are demonstrably false.  In claiming that the government 
never considered debarring BAE, the authors ignore publicly available 
information that the Air Force not only fully considered BAE for possible 
debarment, but may have positively influenced the company’s interactions 
with the DOJ.22
On October 30, 2009, the Air Force issued BAE’s CEO a “Show Cause 
Letter,” nearly five months prior to BAE’s settlement with the DOJ.
 
23  The 
Air Force made clear to BAE that it had serious concerns regarding the 
bribery allegations and BAE’s lack of cooperation with the DOJ.24  After 
receiving the letter, BAE began cooperating with the government, allowing 
the Air Force to conduct investigations into the company’s “processes, 
procedures and culture” to ensure its present responsibility, and eventually 
pleaded guilty to felony charges and agreed to pay a $400 million fine.25  
The documents demonstrate that the Air Force had grounds to debar BAE, 
despite the article’s claim to the contrary.26  Because of the discretion 
afforded to SDOs, the Air Force was able “to facilitate further ethical 
transformation throughout BAE that [would] benefit all U.S. government 
contracts with the company in the future.”27
 
 20. What makes this statement even more bewildering is that the authors note “false 
statements” as grounds for discretionary debarment in other sections of the article. See 
Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 
  While BAE’s misconduct was 
undeniably egregious, in considering only those facts relating to BAE’s 
misconduct, rather than those relating to its remediation and cooperation, it 
is not surprising that the authors draw such brazen and inaccurate 
conclusions. 
2, at 806, 813 n.271. 
 21. Id. at 801. 
 22. See Protecting Taxpayer Dollars:  Are Federal Agencies Making Full Use of 
Suspension and Debarment Sanctions? Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t 
Reform, Subcomm. on Tech., Info. Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and Procurement 
Reform (Oct. 6, 2011) (statement of Steven A. Shaw, Deputy Gen. Counsel (Contractor 
Responsibility), Dep’t of the Air Force) [hereinafter Shaw Testimony], available at 
http://www.safgc.hq.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-111006-094.pdf.  Moreover, 
because agencies do not typically inform the public of matters in which they have considered 
a company for debarment, but declined to do so, it is equally irresponsible to make such 
sweeping, uninformed statements. See generally Canni & Shaw, supra note 15, at 16–17. 
 23. See Letter from Steven Shaw, Deputy Gen. Counsel (Contractor Responsibility), 
Dep’t of the Air Force to Ian King, CEO, BAE Systems plc 1 (July 19, 2011) [hereinafter 
Shaw Letter], available at http://www.safgc.hq.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-110801-
026.pdf.  A “Show Cause Letter” notifies a contractor that it is being considered for 
suspension or debarment and affords the opportunity to submit evidence demonstrating that 
it is a responsible contractor. 
 24. See id. at 1. 
 25. See id.; see also Shaw Testimony, supra note 22, at 3. 
 26. See Shaw Letter, supra note 23. 
 27. See Shaw Testimony, supra note 22, at 4. 
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Because the article incorrectly views debarment as punishment, it regards 
BAE’s post-settlement contract awards as “unfair” and “imprudent.”  
Despite the company’s substantial remediation and overhaul of its 
compliance organization,28
III.  THE THREAT OF DEBARMENT IS THE ULTIMATE 
“SWORD OF DAMOCLES”
 the authors argue that BAE should have been 
banished from the procurement system.  Yet, because debarment is the 
corporate equivalent of the death penalty, the system is designed not only to 
protect the government, but the rights of contractors as well.  To agree with 
the authors is to ignore an entire regulatory regime and its jurisprudence.  
Debarment has the ability to put a company out of business; therefore, the 
regime requires an SDO’s careful consideration of mitigating factors, the 
company’s present responsibility, and whether the government’s interests 
truly need to be protected.  In the world of Too Big to Debar, however, a 
contractor’s due process rights are irrelevant. 
29
Too Big to Debar argues that because large contractors have “virtual 
immunity” from debarment, they are not deterred from bribing foreign 
officials.  In this era of heightened FCPA enforcement, the idea that large 
and sophisticated contractors are traveling the world, actively seeking to 
bribe foreign officials, belies reality.  The government’s recent enforcement 
of the FCPA has been extraordinarily aggressive, and is a primary 
compliance concern facing most multinational corporations.  The costs 
associated with investigating and settling FCPA enforcement actions are 
astounding.  In addition, the government’s focus on individuals has made 
violating the FCPA a terrifying prospect.  For example, the government 
imposed more than $2 billion in criminal fines against individuals between 
1998 and 2010.
 
30  Moreover, the government is increasingly seeking 
lengthy jail time for individuals who bribe foreign officials.31  Other 
common collateral costs of an FCPA violation include significant 
reputational damage, collateral litigation, and substantial blows to a 
company’s financial health.32  As the article acknowledges, “Executives 
reportedly spend sleepless nights wondering if their company will be the 
next target of an FCPA enforcement action.”33
 
 28. See Sentencing Memorandum at 11–12, United States v. BAE Sys., No 1:10-cr-035 
(D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011). 
  If FCPA enforcement costs 
 29. See Steven L. Schooner, The Paper Tiger Stirs:  Rethinking Suspension and 
Debarment, 13 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 211, 214 (2004). 
 30. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE 
CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 2009 REVISED RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING 
BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 39 (2010). 
 31. See, e.g., Press Release, DOJ, Executive Sentenced to 15 Years in Prison for Scheme 
to Bribe Officials at State-Owned Telecommunications Company in Haiti (Oct. 25, 2011), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/October/11-crm-1407.html. 
 32. See Tillipman, supra note 4, at 14–15. 
 33. Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 2, at 783. 
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are so substantial that they already keep executives up at night, perhaps 
their deterrent value has been underestimated. 
In addition to arguing that the current FCPA enforcement regime is not 
aggressive enough, the authors suggest that debarring contractors will 
somehow stop rogue employees from bribing foreign officials.  It is 
fundamentally unrealistic (not to mention statistically impossible) to 
assume that debarment will prevent employee misconduct in large 
multinational companies.34
No matter how sophisticated a company’s internal controls, so long as 
they continue to do business in countries where corruption goes 
unpunished, the demand for bribes and the pressure to provide them will not 
cease.  Indeed, after settling the largest FCPA-related enforcement action in 
history, Siemens completely “overhauled and greatly expanded its 
compliance organization,” and now has hundreds of full-time compliance 
personnel worldwide.
  There is no evidence that any large entity can 
be managed, indefinitely, without human transgression. 
35  The DOJ even noted that the “reorganization and 
remediation efforts of Siemens have been extraordinary and have set a high 
standard for multi-national companies to follow.”36  Yet, despite its model 
compliance program, in October 2011, the media reported that several 
Siemens employees made improper payments to Kuwaiti officials—
improper activity that was, incidentally, detected and reported by Siemens’s 
new compliance regime.37  If a company with one of the most extensive 
compliance programs in the world cannot fully prevent misconduct, what 
company can?  Fortunately, even the DOJ recognizes that no company is 
immune from misconduct, as Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer 
explained:  “There will always be rogue employees who decide to take 
matters into their own hands.  They are a fact of life.”38
IV.  BANKRUPT FIRMS CANNOT AFFORD SOPHISTICATED 
COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 
  Accordingly, 
railing against institutions may be entertaining, but it is neither productive 
nor instructive. 
Too Big to Debar declares that using debarment more frequently will 
encourage greater compliance efforts within a company.  However, in 
claiming that “a two-year hiatus from all government contracts  . . . would 
 
 34. For example, Siemens has 336,000 employees in 190 regions around the world, 
while BAE has nearly 100,000 employees in over 100 countries. See Siemens Worldwide, 
SIEMENS, http://www.siemens.com/about/en/worldwide.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2012); Key 
Facts, BAE SYSTEMS, http://www.baesystems.com/AboutUs/FactSheet/index.htm (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2012). 
 35. Sentencing Memorandum at 22, United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, No. 
1:08-cr-00367 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008). 
 36. Id. at 24. 
 37. Police Investigate Alleged Corruption by Siemens Staff, DEUTSCHE WELLE (June 10, 
2011), http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,15146789,00.html. 
 38. Lanny A. Breuer, Asst. Att’y Gen., Speech at the Annual Meeting of the Washington 
Metropolitan Area Corporate Counsel (Jan. 26, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/pr/speeches/2011/crm-speech-110126.html.   
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induce more firms to comply with the law,”39 the authors ignore the reality 
of debarment.  Debarment often results in the literal end to the existence of 
a company.  Once a company is debarred, it is wholly excluded from 
obtaining new government contracts and subcontracts.40  In addition, under 
certain circumstances, a debarred company’s current contracts may also be 
terminated.41
It belies reality that a company will be debarred, somehow manage to 
survive up to three years on the sidelines, and then expect to come back to 
work for the government, stronger and more compliant than ever.  Indeed, 
“most contractors do not normally spend money improving their 
government-contracts related ethics and compliance structures when their 
government revenue streams are cut off.”
  The debarment of a contractor is also likely to preclude it 
from contracting with state and local governments, foreign governments, 
and international organizations, such as the World Bank and United 
Nations.  The reputational damage caused by debarment often harms a 
company’s relationship with its commercial partners as well.  A debarred 
contractor is almost (if not, entirely) starved of future revenue. 
42  Instead, both FCPA 
enforcement actions and the administrative suspension and debarment 
process provide an “incentive for firms to enter into less draconian 
compliance agreements, and then comply with the terms of those 
agreements.”43
Companies that are spared debarment must agree to a tremendous 
overhaul of their compliance systems and internal controls including regular 
reporting to the government, third-party monitors, enhanced training for 
employees, and ongoing cooperation with the government.
  This is because the government seeks, through its 
enforcement and administrative processes, to influence companies’ 
compliance with the law—not to put them out of business. 
44  By imposing 
mandatory debarment, without consideration of a company’s responsibility 
or mitigating circumstances, the procurement system “would lose the 
opportunity to influence and motivate positive corporate behavior.”45  
Moreover, contractors would lack the incentive to work with SDOs “in 
proactive, creative ways to benefit the entire government.”46
 
 39. See Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 
  Increasing the 
number of debarments would not only discourage companies from 
continuing to do business with the United States, but would scare off new 
entrants to the government marketplace.  With a broad menu of criminal 
and civil sanctions, plus an aggressive prosecutorial regime, governments 
already create enormous barriers to entry that reduce competition for the 
government’s business.  A more aggressive debarment regime would 
further limit the government’s access to the best firms and increase the 
taxpayers’ cost for acquiring their services. 
2, at 820. 
 40. See FAR 9.405(a). 
 41. See FAR 9.405-1(a). 
 42. Canni & Shaw, supra note 15, at 15. 
 43. Schooner, supra note 29, at 214. 
 44. Tillipman, supra note 4, at 16–17. 
 45. Canni & Shaw, supra note 15, at 17. 
 46. Shaw Testimony, supra note 22, at 5. 
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V.  “TOO BIG TO DEBAR” IS A SOUND BITE, NOT A REFLECTION OF REALITY 
The authors contend that because the government is so dependent on 
“favorite” contractors, they are essentially, “too big to debar” and can bribe 
foreign officials with “virtual immunity.”  In making this claim, the article 
ignores every suspension involving a large contractor that has taken place in 
the past decade, including Enron,47 Arthur Andersen,48 MCI Worldcom,49 
several Boeing Launch Systems divisions,50 an L-3 Communications’ 
Special Support Programs Division,51 IBM,52 GTSI,53 and AED.54  By 
presenting severely outdated and one-sided statistics,55
While the article correctly states that large contractors are less likely to 
be debarred than their small to mid-sized counterparts, the reasons are not 
as nefarious as the authors claim.  For example, when misconduct occurs in 
huge multinational corporations, the improper activity often involves a 
specific division or subset of employees, rather than the entire company.  
Thus, in responding to the misconduct, large companies are better 
positioned to sever the diseased sector, remediate, implement robust 
compliance programs, and move forward.  In other words, these companies 
are often far better equipped to demonstrate their present responsibility.  
Small companies, however, often lack the resources to respond to and 
remediate harm and install new and sophisticated compliance programs.  
More importantly, because misconduct often permeates the entire firm, 
small companies are often unable to terminate the employees responsible 
for the misconduct, making full remediation impossible. 
 the article paints a 
wholly inaccurate picture of the current debarment regime. 
In its attack on the debarment regime, the article claims that “officials 
shy away from debarring entities that violate the FCPA due to the short-
term inconvenience of an agency’s inability to transact business with its 
favorite contractor.”56
 
 47. See Dorn McGrath, Misconduct Unrelated to Federal Contracts Could Lead to 
Suspension or Debarment, NAT’L DEF. (May 2005), 
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2005/May/Pages/ethics_corner5770.aspx. 
  Characterizing the debarment of some of the 
government’s largest contractors as an “inconvenience” is laughable.  In 
certain fields, only one or two contractors have the capability to perform 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See Shaw Testimony, supra note 22, at 2. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See Jill R. Aitoro, IBM Suspended from New Federal Contracts, GOV’T EXEC. (Mar. 
31, 2008), http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0308/033108j1.htm. 
 53. See Nick Wakeman, GTSI Suspended but Vows to Fight, WASH. TECH. (Oct. 1, 
2010), http://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2010/10/01/gtsi-fights-sba-charge.aspx. 
 54. See Dana Hedgpeth & Josh Boak, Nonprofit Cut Off from New U.S. Contracts as It 
Faces Investigation, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2010, at A22. 
 55. Indeed, despite their availability, the article fails to cite to any recent suspension and 
debarment statistics, relying solely on statistics that are at least 10-30 years old. See 
Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 2, at 809; see also Council of the Inspectors Gen. on 
Integrity & Efficiency, Annual Reports to the President, available at 
http://www.ignet.gov/randp/arpt1.html (providing annual suspension and debarment 
statistics). 
 56. Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 2, at 775. 
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contract requirements.57  The immediate debarment of one of these 
contractors would leave a monopoly at best, and a vacuum at worst.  
Moreover, large contracts with firms like BAE, Lockheed Martin, and 
Boeing are critical to maintaining military superiority and basic government 
functions.58  As a result, the debarment regime affords SDOs the flexibility 
and discretion necessary to protect the U.S. government’s diverse interests.  
The authors advocate for a system in which due process rights are 
irrelevant, remediation is a fiction, and the government’s business 
partnerships are disposable.  However, “[w]ith fewer major, critical 
contractors available to compete for the government’s most sophisticated 
requirements, it seems disingenuous to bar a key player from future 
competition,” simply for the sake of retribution and arbitrary standards of 
morality.59
VI.  MORE DEBARMENT ≠ MORE VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES 
   
Too Big to Debar also claims that if the government starts debarring 
large contractors more frequently, companies will be so scared of potential 
debarment that they will voluntarily disclose their potential violations of the 
FCPA in hopes of lenient treatment.  Citing the Department of Defense’s 
Voluntary Disclosure program60 (a regime that was wiped out nearly four 
years ago by the FAR 52.203-13 Mandatory Disclosure rules61) as evidence 
of such potential leniency, the article contends that “[b]y debarring 
companies in egregious, highly public cases of foreign corruption, federal 
prosecutors can leverage the escalated level of risk associated with 
debarment to incentivize more companies to come forward in exchange for 
leniency.”62
 
 57. Many major weapons systems and components were dual-sourced until the early 
1990s, when, in an effort to save money, the Department of Defense aggressively embarked 
upon an effort to consolidate the defense industrial base. See John Deutch, Consolidation of 
the U.S. Defense Industrial Base, ACQUISITION REV. Q., Fall 2001, at 137–38, available at 
http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic706688.files/Consolidation_of_the_US_Defense_In
dustrial_Base.pdf. 
  The idea that companies will be more likely to come forward 
in a system where debarment is used more frequently as a tool of 
punishment defies logic.  Hinging a company’s fate not on its remedial 
measures or present responsibility, but on some subjective (and likely 
 58. See generally Steven S. Schooner & Daniel S. Greenspahn, Too Dependent on 
Contractors?  Minimum Standards for Responsible Governance, J. OF CONT. MGMT., Sept. 
2008. 
 59. Schooner, supra note 29, at 214. 
 60. Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 2, at 809 n.243. 
 61. The authors surprisingly cite to the defunct Department of Defense Voluntary 
Disclosure Program as support for one of their arguments.  The new mandatory disclosure 
rules were a “sea change” in procurement law, requiring, among other things, the mandatory 
disclosure of potential violations of the law, the adoption of stringent internal controls and 
ethics programs, and new grounds for suspension and debarment for failure to comply with 
the mandatory disclosure requirements. See FAR Case 2007-006, Contractor Business Ethics 
Compliance Program and Disclosure Requirements, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,064 (Nov. 12, 2008) (to 
be codified at 48 C.F.R. pt. 2, 3, 9, 42, and 52).  Notably, potential violations of the FCPA 
are not expressly required under this regime. 
 62. Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 2, at 809. 
58 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW RES GESTAE [Vol. 80 
politically motivated) determination that a case is “egregious,” would deter 
any major company from coming forward for fear that their familiar name 
and U.S. government business would result in their death sentence.  
Contrary to the authors’ claims, it would give contractors an “incentive to 
stonewall, deny problems exist, and not make changes for fear of potential 
liability that would result in a mandatory debarment regardless of their 
willingness to change.”63
CONCLUSION 
 
Ignoring the glaring factual errors, selective quotes, and incorrect 
assumptions, Too Big to Debar appears to assert that it is morally wrong to 
“reward” government contractors that have misbehaved. By injecting 
theories of morality and punishment into an administrative regime, the 
article elevates the simple, almost visceral desire for large-scale retribution 
over the more nuanced best interests of the government. 
While there are instances in which corporate misconduct is so egregious, 
pervasive, and untreatable that debarment may be appropriate, this nuclear 
sanction should not be utilized simply because it is politically popular.  By 
discounting the actual consequences of debarment, while artificially 
amplifying its impact on FCPA deterrence, the authors fail to observe a 
trend that has been occurring over the last few years.  As companies adapt 
to the new era of FCPA enforcement, large and successful government 
contractors already have sophisticated compliance and internal controls in 
place.64  The companies pilloried in the article have already spent 
substantial sums of money overhauling their FCPA compliance programs—
both in response to their own FCPA violations and by observing the 
violations committed by others.  More importantly, putting the philosophy 
aside, in an era of outsourced government, these large, sophisticated firms 
permit governments to serve the populations they govern.65
Too Big to Debar follows a well-trodden populist track by vilifying and 
bashing contractors without regard for nuance or reality.  Experts 
understand that there is a surefire method for ensuring that there will be no 
fraud in government contracting:  simply stop awarding contracts.  Then 
governments can place their trust directly in politicians and public officials 
who, as history has proven time and time again, are insulated from 
temptation, immune to missteps, and endlessly toil with the public’s best 
interest at heart.  If that solution does not set your mind at ease, maybe it is 
time to return to a more thoughtful, reasoned analysis of this complex, 
challenging issue. 
 
 
 
 63. Shaw Testimony, supra note 22, at 5. 
 64. In fact, most of the largest government contractors voluntarily belong to 
organizations dedicated solely to the promotion of ethical compliance programs and culture. 
See, e.g., DII Member Companies 2009–2010, DEF. INDUS. INITIATIVE, 
http://www.dii.org/our-companies (last visited Jan. 6, 2012). 
 65. See generally Schooner & Greenspahn, supra note 58. 
